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Germany, France, and the Netherlands have pursued different types
of integration policies. Using data from a mixed method study, this
paper investigates whether and how these differences have affected the
settlement country and ethnic identification of the children of Turk-
ish immigrants. The results indicate that integration policies do not
affect ethnic identification, but an inclusive policy has a positive
impact on settlement country identification. Multicultural policies do
not seem to have any effect. Despite processes of exclusion and self-
exclusion in all three countries, our respondents have developed a
strong connection to their settlement country and in particular to
their place of residence.
INTRODUCTION
What shapes immigrants’ identifications? There is an extensive literature
on the identification of immigrants and their descendants. This research
has found that immigrants’ identification patterns are shaped by a range
of factors. These include migration-related factors such as country of
origin, generation, and age at migration (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001;
Berry et al., 2006; Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Constant, 2007).
Socio-economic factors such as level of education and social class are also
relevant (Lee, 2005; Faas, 2009). Numerous studies have shown the
impact of discrimination; (children of) immigrants who experience more
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discrimination tend to identify more strongly with the ethnic group and
less strongly with the settlement country (Verkuyten and Nekuee, 1999;
Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Verkuyten and Brug, 2002; Rumbaut, 2005;
Berry et al., 2006). Furthermore, there is some evidence that ethnic
concentration and segregation at the neighborhood and school level affect
identification patterns through their influence on the possibilities for
interethnic contact (Rumbaut, 1994; Butterfield, 2004).
A factor that has received relatively little attention in previous studies
is the role of settlement country integration policies (cf. Thomson and
Crul, 2007). Western European countries have developed different policy
approaches to immigrant integration. They have provided immigrants
with varying degrees of citizenship rights and also taken different
approaches to the accommodation of immigrant cultures (see, e.g., the
studies by Castles, 1995; Geddes and Niessen, 2005; Koopmans et al.,
2005). While there is an ever-growing amount of comparative integration
policy studies (e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1999; Groenendijk, Guild,
and Barzilay, 2000; Geddes and Niessen, 2005; Baubo¨ck et al., 2006), so
far little cross-national comparative research has investigated the effect of
these differences on immigrants’ identification (but see the study by Berry
et al., 2006). This is all the more remarkable given the influential role
that is attributed to policies in political and societal debates on immigrant
integration.
Most of the studies that have looked at the role of integration policies
suggest that there is indeed a relationship with immigrants’ identification
(Kastoryano, 2002; Heckmann, Lederer, and Worbs, 2001; Tucci and
Groh-Samberg, 2008; Faas, 2010; but for a counter example, see the study
by Berry et al., 2006). However, these studies have either focused on
immigrant organizations and group identities (Kastoryano, 2002), or have
looked at different groups in different countries, making it hard to deter-
mine whether found differences are because of national policies or differ-
ences in composition and background of the immigrant groups
(Heckmann, Lederer, and Worbs, 2001; Tucci and Groh-Samberg,
2008).
In this paper, we investigate to what extent and in what way
national integration policies impact immigrants’ identification patterns.
We look at the identification of the children of Turkish immigrants in
three countries that markedly differ in their integration policies, namely
Germany, France, and the Netherlands (Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 1995;
Koopmans et al., 2005). Turkish immigrants form a significant group in
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each of these three countries. We focus on the children of immigrants
instead of the immigrants themselves because the children have at least in
part been socialized in the settlement countries and are therefore more
likely to be influenced by the national policies. Both people who were
born in their respective settlement countries from Turkish parents (second
generation) and those born in Turkey who migrated as minors (in-between
generation) are included in our analyses.1 In line with the work of among
others (Berry, 1997, 2001; see also the study by Zimmermann, Zimmer-
man, and Constant, 2007), we view immigrants’ identification as consisting
of two independent dimensions, namely settlement country identification
and ethnic identification and will explore both these dimensions.
While realizing that the (children of) immigrants may also identify
with other (broader or narrower) identities, as identity is a multilayered
concept, we have chosen to focus on these two dimensions because they
are most likely to be influenced by national integration policies. In the
analysis of our qualitative data, however, we also discuss the role of local
identifications as these seemed to be an important means of connecting to
the country of settlement.
The analyses in this paper are based on a unique dataset consisting
of a large-scale telephone survey and follow-up in-depth interviews with a
subgroup of the respondents. The data have been gathered on the same
narrowly defined target group in each country. This allows circumventing
many of the problems of cross-national comparisons caused by cross-
national differences in the definition of the target population (foreigners,
immigrants, racial, or ethnic minorities) and in the composition of the
immigrant population (different origin countries, timing, and type of
migration). The in-depth interview respondents were also recruited in a
way that maximizes cross-national comparability.
In what follows, we will first explain our conceptualization of identifi-
cation and national integration policies. Based on a subsequent discussion of
theories and empirical studies on the relation between policies and immi-
grants’ identification, we develop five hypotheses. We then present our three
policy cases: Germany, France and the Netherlands. After an explanation of
the data collection, the hypotheses are tested with the data from the
telephone survey. In the multivariate regressions, we control for several fac-
tors that are known to influence identification. The results support some of
1The data presented in this paper are part of a larger study on the ethnic retention and
host culture adoption of Turkish immigrants and their offspring (Ersanilli, 2010).
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the hypotheses on the relation between policies and identification and refute
others. Ethnic identification appears to be high regardless of the type of
national integration policies. Settlement country identification is much
lower and does show cross-national differences; though, these are not very
much pronounced. The data from the in-depth interviews are used to
explore the reasons for the relatively low settlement country identification
and size and direction of the cross-national differences. Our analysis shows
that identification is influenced by processes of both exclusion and self-
exclusion. It also shows that despite apparent low levels of settlement coun-
try identification, the majority of the children of Turkish immigrants have
indeed formed a connection to their countries of settlement.
INTEGRATION POLICIES AND IMMIGRANTS’
IDENTIFICATION
With regard to identification, one of the most influential models is that
of J.W. Berry (see, e.g., 1997, 2001). He postulated that the retention of
the ethnic culture and the adoption of the culture of the settlement coun-
try are two independent dimensions. Several studies have confirmed the
existence of these two separate dimensions (e.g., Ryder, Alden, and
Paulhus, 2000; but see the study by Birman, Trickett, and Vinokurov,
2002). Our study is modeled after Berry’s bi-dimensional model in that
we treated settlement country and ethnic identification as separate dimen-
sions in both the survey and the interviews. This allowed us to analytically
distinguish between what stimulates ethnic identification and what stimu-
lates settlement country identification.
There are several typologies that capture cross-national differences
in integration policies. In this paper, we use the typology developed by
Koopmans et al. (2005; see also the study by Koopmans and Statham,
2000) that builds on previous typologies (e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Castles,
1995). This typology consists of two dimensions. The first dimension is
the extent to which citizenship is open to immigrants and the extent to
which immigrants receive the same individual rights as the native
population of the settlement country; we will refer to this as ‘‘individual
equality’’. The second dimension is the degree of accommodation of
diversity, measured as support for ethnic or religious group formation
and granting special rights or exempting cultural groups from general
rules.
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Accommodation of diversity is one of the focal points in debates on
the effects of policies on immigrant integration. There are two rival per-
spectives. A first perspective argues that policies that accommodate immi-
grant cultures and religions can stimulate settlement country identification
(Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2002). If immigrants do not have to abandon
their (parents’) culture of origin to become members of the settlement
society, this lowers the emotional costs of settlement country identification
(Berry, 1994). This leads to the hypothesis that in countries with a higher
degree of accommodation of immigrant culture, immigrants show a
higher degree of settlement country identification (H1, see Figure I).
Others have argued that the facilitation of cultural difference can
have negative effects on immigrants’ orientation on the settlement society
(e.g., Berry, 2001; Meyer 2002). From a cost-and-benefit perspective, they
argue that when countries facilitate the setup of ethnic organizations and
services in immigrant languages, this decreases the need for immigrants to
orient themselves toward the settlement society. If accommodation takes
the form of limited assimilation requirements for access to naturalization
or permanent residence permits, the benefits associated with adoption of
the settlement country culture and identity will be further reduced. Based
on this perspective, we expect that in countries with a higher degree of
accommodation of immigrant culture, immigrants show a lower degree of
settlement country identification (H2).
Following this same cost-and-benefit perspective, it can also be
argued that the accommodation of diversity will lead to a higher degree
of ethnic identification (H3). The accommodation of diversity increases
the benefits of ethnic identification, while reducing the costs. Benefits of
Individual Equality
Accommodation of
cultural difference
Ethnic
identification
Settlement country
identification+ (H4)
+ (H3)
+ (H1)— (H2) — (H5)
Figure I. Theoretical Model
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ethnic identification are increased by the subsidies and political opportuni-
ties that accommodative policies provide for ethnic media, organizations,
and consultative bodies. At the same time, accommodative policies lower
the costs of ethnic identification because access to citizenship and partici-
pation in settlement society institutions is not conditional on abandoning
the origin culture.
To understand the potential impact of the degree on individual
equality on immigrants’ identification, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel,
1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) provides valuable insights. According to
SIT, people want to belong to the higher status group – in case of immi-
grants, it can be assumed that this is the settlement society (Padilla and
Perez, 2003; Ward and Leong, 2006; Verkuyten, 2006; see also the study
by Bourhis et al., 1997). However, because people also want to maintain
a positive self-concept, they are only likely to identify with a group if they
feel they will be accepted as members. Put differently, they are more likely
to identify with a group if they perceive the group boundaries as perme-
able. In countries with a high degree of individual equality, immigrants
have easy access to citizenship and non-citizens also experience a relatively
high level of rights. This legal inclusion indicates a permeable boundary
between immigrants and the settlement society (cf. Alba, 2005). Legal
inclusion is also likely to be related to a higher degree of openness to
immigrants on the part of settlement society members. This is both
because policies are determined in interaction with the settlement society
and because society is influenced by policies (Bourhis et al., 1997). There-
fore, in countries with a higher degree of individual equality, immigrants
should show a higher degree of settlement country identification (H4).
A low degree of individual equality can lead to a process of reactive
ethnicity (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Verkuyten and Brug, 2002). If
immigrants do not get equal citizenship rights, they feel excluded from
the settlement society. This cannot only have a negative effect on their
level of settlement country identification, but also stimulate their ethnic
identification, because in search of a positive social identity immigrants
withdraw in their own group. This leads to our fifth and final hypothesis
that in countries with a low degree of individual equality, immigrants will
show a higher level of ethnic identification (H5). Of course feelings of
exclusion can also be caused by factors other than integration policies such
as a marginalized socio-economic position (low education, unemploy-
ment) or discrimination. Therefore, in our test of this hypothesis, we will
control for these factors.
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CASES: INTEGRATION POLICIES IN GERMANY, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
Comparative policy studies have classified Germany, France, and the
Netherlands as different integration policy types (Brubaker, 1992; Castles,
1995; Koopmans et al., 2005). The models approach of integration poli-
cies has been criticized for ignoring evidence of growing cross-national
policy convergence and the implementation of policies that at first sight
seem at odds with national traditions (Soysal, 1994; Weil, 2001; Joppke,
2007). A study by Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2010) that com-
pared the policies in ten European countries including Germany, France,
and the Netherlands in the period from 1980 to 2008 showed that
despite developments in policies, differences between the three countries
in our study have remained and are also fairly consistent. These findings
are supported by other comparative studies (Geddes and Niessen, 2005;
Banting et al., 2006).
Of the three countries in this study, the Netherlands has over the
years most accommodated diversity. The Netherlands has an extensive
system of ethnic and religious consultative bodies and ethnic and religious
groups can set up their own state-funded broadcasting corporations and
(Islamic) schools. Until 2003, the integration requirements for naturaliza-
tion were modest. In 1984, the responsible State Secretary declared that
for naturalization ‘‘identification with the Dutch people and history is
not necessary’’ nor ‘‘letting go of the own culture and no longer feeling
especially involved with the weal and woe of his country of origin’’
(quoted in Heijs, 1995:193). The rise of the right-wing populist Pim
Fortuyn in 2002 and the subsequent center-right governments has not
led to the end of accommodative policies. Although there have been
changes such as the toughening of naturalization requirements, many
other measures have stayed in place (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008;
Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2010). The range of official con-
sultative bodies has even been extended with two Muslim councils and
the council for Chinese (Ersanilli, 2010). France in contrast tries to main-
tain a universal public sphere that is free of particularistic identities. With
the exception of a few cities, it does not have ethnic consultative bodies
nor provides funds for ethnic broadcasting corporations. Germany also
has few accommodative policies. At the local level, there are consultative
bodies, but these are based on foreign citizenship, not on ethnic group
membership as in the Netherlands. Both Germany and France have long
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had stronger integration requirements for naturalization than the Nether-
lands (Baubo¨ck et al., 2006). In Germany, membership of an ethnic
organization was long seen as contra-indication of integration.
France and the Netherlands have pursued policies that offer immi-
grants and their descendants a higher degree of individual equality than
Germany. French-born children of immigrants automatically acquire
French nationality at the age of majority. Immigrants can acquire French
nationality after 5 years of residence. French citizenship is viewed as a cru-
cial element in immigrant integration (Favell, 2001; Bertossi, 2009).
Dutch-born children of immigrants can opt in to Dutch nationality.2
Immigrants who came to the Netherlands at a later age can naturalize
after 5 years of residence. Germany has long had the most difficult access
to citizenship. Since 2000, German-born children of immigrants are
granted citizenship at birth. However, in return these children have to
renounce the citizenship of their parents’ country of origin before the age
of 23.3 It will take years before this change in policy will affect significant
shares of the German second generation (cf. Alba, 2005). Legal protection
from discrimination is more extensive in both France and the Netherlands
than in Germany (Geddes and Niessen, 2005; Koopmans, Michalowski,
and Waibel, 2010). It was not until 2005 that Germany implemented the
European directive on discrimination. The Netherlands also offers non-
citizens a high degree of equality; they are allowed to work in all sections
of the civil service with the exception of the police and army and have
voting rights in local elections after 5 years of legal residence. In France
and Germany, permanent resident foreigners from non-EU member-states
do not have voting rights and also have more limited access to civil service
jobs (Ersanilli, 2010). The Netherlands, to conclude, has gone furthest in
accommodating diversity, while also offering immigrants equal rights.
France has not done much in the way of accommodating diversity, but
grants immigrants equal rights, while Germany also has a low degree of
accommodating diversity and has only recently started to extend immi-
grants equal rights.
2Since 2003 this is dependent on a successful public order investigation. In that same year,
the option-right was extended to people who arrived in the Netherlands before the age of
four.
3In addition, this ius soli citizenship applies only when one or both parents have legally
lived in Germany for at least 8 years.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Cross-national comparisons of immigrant integration are complicated by
the large variances in composition of the immigrant population. As country
of origin is known to influence the degree of ethnic and settlement country
identification (see, e.g., the studies by Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Zimmer-
mann, Zimmerman, and Constant, 2007), we focus on the same origin
group in all three countries, namely Turks. Turks are the largest immigrant
group in Europe. Large-scale migration was set-off by the guest-worker pro-
grams in the 1960s. After the end of guest-worker programs in the mid
1970s, large-scale family migration followed. Germany was the main desti-
nation of Turkish migrants and currently holds a Turkish origin population
of almost 2.5 million. The two other most important destination countries
were the Netherlands and France, that each currently has a Turkish origin
population of about 350,000. As type and timing of migration can also
influence integration, the target group is limited to people who migrated
during the guest-worker era – that is, before 1975 – and their offspring who
were born in the settlement country or arrived as minors under family reuni-
fication regulations. Turkey is a country with large regional differences in
wealth, education, ethnic composition, and religious life. Because these
regional differences might also impact integration, the target group is fur-
ther limited to immigrants from South-Central and East-Central Anatolia.4
South-Central Anatolia is a predominantly ethnic Turkish and religiously
Sunni Muslim region. East-Central Anatolia, by contrast, has more ethnic
and religious diversity (Kurds and Alevis).5
To minimize sampling bias, we used the same combination of sam-
pling techniques in all three countries. The main sample was drawn from
online telephone books on the basis of stems of common Turkish sur-
names.6 To compensate for a possible bias in this technique, the sample
4South-Central Anatolia consists of the provinces Afyon, Aksaray, Karaman, Kayseri,
Konya, Nevs¸ehir, and Nig˘de. East-Central Anatolia encompasses Adiyaman, Amasya, Elazig˘,
Malatya, Tokat, Tunceli, and Sivas.
5Alevism is a humanistic current within Islam. In general, the relation between the sexes is
different from that prevalent within Sunni Islam, and Alevi women rarely wear headscar-
ves. According to rough estimates, Alevis constitute up to 25 per cent of the Turkish pop-
ulation. In Turkey, Alevis sometimes face discrimination because they are not considered
to be ‘‘real’’ Muslims since they do not visit a mosque or observe Ramadan.
6For information on the success of this technique for different immigrant populations,
see for example the study by Galonska, Berger, and Koopmans (2003).
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has been supplemented with a sample of migrant holiday makers in the
Turkish regions of Sivas and Karaman and a cross-generational and cross-
national snowball sample.7
The telephone survey was held between November 2005 and June
2006. All interviews were conducted by bilingual interviewers. Of these
interviews, 794 were with members of the in-between and second genera-
tion. The demographic characteristics of the sample are similar across
countries (see Appendix A). At the end of the questionnaire, respondents
were asked whether they were willing to participate in an in-depth inter-
view. These interviews were held in 2007. In this article, we analyzed the
interviews with the 57 respondents who received at least part of their edu-
cation in the settlement country. All interviews were conducted by the
same person; a Dutch female researcher of non-Turkish immigrant back-
ground. The majority of the respondents were interviewed at home, and
the others in cafes. When possible the interviews were recorded and fully
transcribed.
Because nearly all respondents of the in-depth interviews were
recruited through the survey sample instead of through snowball sampling
as is common in qualitative studies, the representativeness of the respon-
dents can be examined (see Appendix B).8 The demographic characteristics
of the sample are similar across countries, with the exception of origin
region and religious denomination. The German interview respondents
are less prone to identify as Turks than the survey respondents. For iden-
tification with the settlement country, the differences are small and in the
same direction for each country; the interview respondents more identify
with the settlement country than the average of the survey. These differ-
ences between the in-depth interview and survey respondents have been
taken into account in the analyses.
7Detailed information on the sampling techniques used in this study and response rates
can be found in the study by Ersanilli (2010).
8To facilitate the interviewing, in each country, two regions with a high share of Turkish
residents were selected. For Germany, interviews took place in the states of Nordrhein-
Westphalia and Baden-Wuerttemberg, the French interviews in the regions Rhone-Alpes
and Alsace and the Dutch interviews in the Randstad and the eastern provinces of Gelder-
land and Overijssel. One of the Dutch respondents and two of the German respondents
had not participated in the telephone questionnaire but were contacted through snowball
sampling. The averages of the demographic variables with inclusion of the respondents
recruited through snowball sampling c are listed in an extra column of table B marked
‘‘SB’’.
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Variables of the Regression Models
Identification with the settlement country and the ethnic group was
measured with three survey items; ‘‘To what extent do you feel [group
member]?’’, ‘‘To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?’’ and ‘‘To
what extent are you proud of being [group member]?’’ Answer categories
ranged from 1 ‘‘not at all’’ to 5 ‘‘completely.’’9 Respondents were first
asked the three questions about their ethnic identification and subse-
quently about their identification with the country of settlement. Factor
analysis showed a two-factor solution, supporting the idea that there are
two distinctive dimensions of identification. The items form scales for
settlement country identification (Cronbach’s alpha 0.78) and Turkish
identification (Cronbach’s alpha 0.68).
To test our hypotheses on the differences between Germany, France,
and the Netherlands, two country dummies are included. In the table pre-
sented below, Germany serves as the reference group.
As mentioned we controlled for a number of other factors known to
influence settlement country and ethnic identification. First, we included
a dummy variable for the second generation (with the in-between gener-
ation and reference group).10 Second, we included two dummies for
education (with no or primary education as reference category). These
dummies both capture the effects of education as settlement country
institution11 and as an (contra-)indicator of social marginalization. As a
9For ethnic identification, the questions are referred to ‘‘Turks’’. ‘‘Turks’’ is taken to mean
all people who come from the country Turkey. Since Turkey is a country with several eth-
nic and religious subgroups, it is possible that the ‘‘ethnic’’ identification of some of our
respondents lies partly or primarily with a (sub-)group such as Kurds. To call the identifi-
cation with Turks, an ‘‘ethnic’’ identification is thus not always appropriate. For lack of a
better alternative, we have, however, chosen to nevertheless use this term. Because of the
sensitivity of the Kurdish question in Turkey and the Turkish diaspora, and because this
would divert too much from our actual research subject, we have not further explored
respondents’ identification with (sub)categories of the Turkish population.
10Because our sample includes second-generation members, we cannot control for age at
migration. Though it would be possible to code all members of the second generation as
being ‘‘0’’ at migration, this would result in unacceptable levels of multicollinearity.
11As Schiffauer et al. (2004) and Faas (2009) have found, schools are important places of
transmission of national conceptions of citizenship. Depending on the school system and
degree of centralization, different schools within the same countries can have some leeway
in how they transmit the national curriculum and citizenship conception.
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further (contra-)indicator of marginalization, we included a dummy for
people who are currently employed. As some studies have shown gender
differences in identification (e.g., Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Con-
stant, 2007), we added a dummy variable for women (with men as the
reference group). Because some studies have shown an effect of ethnic
concentration, we also included a control variable for the share of Turkish
immigrants in the respondent’s place of residence. This way we also con-
trolled for the difference in the relative size of the Turkish immigrant
population across our three countries of study. As it cannot be assumed
that people from the two Turkish regions and religious denominations
have the same degree of host country and ethnic identification, we also
included dummies for region (with South-Central Anatolia as reference
category) and Alevites (with Sunnites as reference category). Finally, we
added dummies for the different sample techniques with the phonebook
sample serving as reference group.
From a Social Identity Theory perspective, we would not only
expect a direct relation between policies and identification, but also an
indirect effect through the attitudes and behavior of the society of settle-
ment (Bourhis et al., 1997). The hypotheses for both ethnic and settle-
ment country identification will therefore be tested in two models. The
first model includes the country dummies and all control variables. In the
second model, two additional independent variables are added as a further
test of the hypotheses based on SIT. First, we add the degree of perceived
discrimination. Respondents were asked ‘‘Can you tell me how often you
feel discriminated in [country] because of your origin or religion?’’ The
five-point answer scale ranged from 1 ‘‘never’’ to 5 ‘‘all the time.’’
Second, we add a question on the other-attribution of identity. Respon-
dents were asked ‘‘to what extent do people in [country] perceive you as
[settlement country member]?’’ The five-point answer scale ranged from 1
‘‘not at all’’ to 5 ‘‘completely.’’
ETHNIC AND SETTLEMENT COUNTRY IDENTIFICATIONS;
THE FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY
We will first look at ethnic identification. The hypothesis following the
material costs-and-benefits perspective (H3) predicted higher ethnic iden-
tification in countries with a higher degree of accommodation of diversity.
As the Netherlands has accommodated diversity to a higher extent than
France and Germany, we should see the highest scores in the Netherlands.
918 International Migration Review
However, if the lower level of individual equality has led to reactive
ethnicity (H5), we should see higher levels of ethnic identification in
Germany.
With a mean ranging from 4.33 in Germany to 4.46 in the Nether-
lands (see Appendix A), Turkish identification is high in all three coun-
tries. Table 1 presents the results of the multivariate analysis. The first
column presents the results for the first model on ethnic identification.
The cross-national differences are not significant, leading to the refutation
of both hypotheses. Neither the degree of accommodation of diversity nor
that of individual equality seems to have a significant impact on the level
of ethnic identification of Turkish immigrants.12
Despite the lack of cross-national differences in our first model, we
will still test the second model to see whether this affects our results.
Before we added the two variables to the model, we first used them as
TABLE 1
UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS OF OLS REGRESSION OF IDENTIFICATION WITH TURKS AND WITH THE
SETTLEMENT COUNTRY (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
Ethnic identification Settlement country identification
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Germany Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
France 0.04 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.55*** (0.10) 0.39*** (0.10)
Netherlands 0.04 (0.07) 0.07 (0.07) 0.45*** (0.10) 0.34*** (0.10)
East-Central Anatolia )0.14* (0.06) )0.14* (0.06) 0.18** (0.09) 0.18* (0.08)
Alevi )0.38*** (0.10) )0.36*** (0.10) 0.16 (0.15) 0.06 (0.14)
Second generation 0.01 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.07 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08)
Female )0.07 (0.06) )0.04 (0.06) 0.03 (0.08) )0.09 (0.08)
Education, none primary Ref Ref Ref Ref
Secondary education 0.04 (0.09) 0.09 (0.09) 0.44*** (0.12) 0.34** (0.12)
Post-secondary education )0.17 (0.11) )0.10 (0.11) 0.55*** (0.15) 0.37* (0.14)
Working )0.14* (0.06) )0.13* (0.06) 0.07 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08)
Phone book sample (ref cat)
Holiday sample 0.17* (0.08) 0.18* (0.08) )0.03 (0.12) )0.06 (0.11)
Snowball sample 0.08 (0.06) 0.10 (0.06) )0.05 (0.09) )0.11 (0.08)
Share of Turkish immigrants 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Seen as host country member )0.10** (0.02) 0.30*** (0.03)
Frequency of experienced
discrimination
)0.03 (0.02) )0.06* (0.03)
Constant 4.49*** (0.12) 4.69*** (0.13) 1.74*** (0.17) 1.43*** (0.18)
R2 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.21
Adj R2 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.19
N 709 709 710 710
Two-tailed t-tests, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
12This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the addition of the country dummies
does not lead to a significant improvement compared to a model with only the control
variables (LR-test of nested models is not significant).
Identification of Children of Turkish Immigrants 919
dependent variables and tested for cross-national differences. If the more
inclusive policies in France and the Netherlands also affect the settlement
populations, we should find lower levels of discrimination and higher
levels of ascribed settlement country identity. The scores for ascribed set-
tlement country identity are comparable with those of settlement country
identification, ranging from 2 in Germany to 2.7 in France (see Appen-
dix A). Multivariate analysis using the same control variables as in the
model presented in Table 1 showed significant cross-national differences;
respondents in the Netherlands and France feel more strongly that they
are seen as settlement country members than respondents in Germany do
(p < 0.01 and 0.001, respectively, table not shown). The difference
between France and the Netherlands is not significant. This suggests that
the more inclusive policy is reflected in the society of settlement.
Perceived discrimination is fairly modest with an average of 2.3 in the
Netherlands and 2.4 in both France and Germany (see Appendix A).
Strikingly, perceived discrimination does not vary significantly between
the countries (table not shown).
Adding the two variables to the model on ethnic identification
(column 2 of Table 1) significantly improves the level of explained vari-
ance (p < 0.001). The more people feel perceived as settlement country
members, the less they identify as Turk. This is in line with earlier find-
ings in Germany (Skrobanek, 2009) and the Netherlands (Verkuyten,
2006) that have found a negative effect of perceived permeability on eth-
nic identification. Contrary to earlier studies, however, perceived discrimi-
nation has no significant effect.13 Adding the two variables does not affect
the cross-national differences; these all remain insignificant. We also find
few significant effects for the control variables. People who are employed
less identify with Turks than people who are not active in the labor mar-
ket. This shows that socio-economic marginalization is related to stronger
ethnic identification. However, the effects for level of education are not
significant. Surprisingly, there is no significant difference between the
in-between and second generation. The analysis further shows that Alevis
and people from East-Central Anatolia have a less strong identification
with Turks than Sunnis and people from South-Central Anatolia. Possibly
this is because part of them are of Kurdish origin and have an ethnic
Kurdish instead of Turkish identification.
13This is not due to multicollinearity. The correlation between the two variables is only
0.15.
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We now turn to settlement country identification. According to the
hypothesis based on Social Identity Theory (H4), we should find a higher
degree of settlement country identification in the Netherlands and France
because these countries provide a higher degree of individual equality than
Germany. The two hypotheses on the effects of the accommodation of
diversity lead to rival predictions for the Netherlands. If it has a positive
effect (H1), levels of settlement country identification should be higher in
the Netherlands than in France and Germany, and if it has a negative
effect (H2), they should be lower.
In all three countries, the level of identification with the settlement
country is much lower than the ethnic identification.14 It ranges from
2.37 in Germany to 2.83 in France (see Appendix A). The multivariate
analysis shows that settlement country identification is significantly lower
in Germany than in France and the Netherlands (see Table 1). The differ-
ence between France and the Netherlands is not significant. These find-
ings do not support either of the rival hypotheses on the effects of the
accommodation of diversity; it suggests that this type of policy is neither
a barrier nor a stimulus for settlement country identification. The results
are in line with the prediction based on Social Identity Theory; the higher
degree of individual equality in France and the Netherlands indeed seems
to lead to a higher degree of settlement country identification. But how
much of these cross-national differences are because of feelings of inclu-
sion and how much to feelings of discrimination?
The addition of the two variables in the second model more than
doubles the amount of explained variance (model improvement is signifi-
cant at p < 0.001). The more people feel perceived as a settlement coun-
try member, the more they also identify as such. Discrimination, on the
other hand, has only a marginally significant negative effect (p < 0.10) on
settlement country identification. What is interesting to see is that
although the differences between Germany on the one hand and France
and the Netherlands on the other are still significant, they have become
smaller. The decrease in the size of the coefficients is significant
(p < 0.001 for France and p < 0.01 for the Netherlands). This supports
the idea that policies with a higher degree of individual equality do not
only have direct impact on immigrants’ identification, but also an indirect
impact through the attitudes of the settlement society.
14This pattern has emerged from other studies as well (see e.g., the studies by Phalet,
Vanloteringen, and Entzinger, 2000; Berry et al., 2006).
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These results suggest that integration policies have an effect on set-
tlement country identification; however, the size of the effect should not
be overstated. The country dummies account for almost half of the vari-
ance explained by the first model, but this is only about four percent of
the total variance.15
If we look at the control variables, we see that contrary to previous
studies (e.g., Portes and Rumbaut, 2001), members of the second genera-
tion do not show a higher degree of identification with the settlement
country than the in-between generation. Settlement country identification
does increase with level of education. The effect of education significantly
decreases in the second model. This shows that people with a higher edu-
cation have a stronger settlement country identification, in part because
they feel more accepted as members of the settlement society. Labor
market participation has no significant effect. Finally, people from East-
Central Anatolia – who showed lower Turkish identification – show a
higher level of settlement country identification.
How can we understand the high level of ethnic identification
compared with the low level of settlement country identification? As our
sample has spent part or all of their childhood in their settlement coun-
tries, one might have expected these children of immigrants to form a
bond with these countries. Before we turn to the in-depth interview
data to shed more light on this issue, it is interesting to first have a clo-
ser look at the data from the telephone survey. When analyzed sepa-
rately, the three items used to measure identification (To what extent
do you feel, feel connected, and are you proud of being [group
member]?) show a remarkable pattern (see Figures II and III). First, the
difference between the level of connectedness with settlement country
members and Turks is much smaller than the difference in feeling
Turkish ⁄ settlement country member and especially pride in group mem-
bership. Second, for Turkish identification, connectedness is the lowest
scoring item, while for identification with the settlement country it is
the highest scoring item.16 This indicates that settlement country
15Other models that use identification as a dependent variable also show low R-squares.
See for example the studies by Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Constant (2007) and
Ajrouch & Jamal (2007).
16When analyzed separately in multivariate regressions, none of the three ethnic identifica-
tion items show cross-national differences, and all three items of settlement country identi-
fication show significantly lower levels in Germany than in the other two countries.
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identification is experienced in a different way than Turkish identifica-
tion. We will now turn to the data from the in-depth interviews to fur-
ther explore this pattern.
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Figure II. Means by Country on Items for Identification with Turks
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Figure III. Means by Country on Items for Identification with Settlement Country
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THE HOMELAND IS NOT HOME: THE INTERVIEWS
In the interviews, the respondents were again asked about their identifica-
tion with the settlement country and Turks. As in the telephone survey,
the responses in general showed a strong identification with Turks. The
majority (N = 41) did identify with the settlement country but to a
lesser extent than with Turks. Although a minority claimed a stronger
settlement country than Turkish identification (N = 7), a slightly larger
group (N = 9) claimed a uniquely Turkish identification. The argu-
ments behind the two identifications differed. The Turkish identity was
mainly grounded in origin, primarily in having Turkish parents. Being
Turkish is experienced as a biological identity; you are a child of your
parents:
I know that my parents come from there, and I am simply from there, I cannot be a
German, I am a Turk
(Germany, second generation, male)
Many respondents also wanted their own children to preserve Turkish
culture and identity, meaning to be fluent in Turkish and proud of their
roots and culture. This attachment to Turkish culture seems to originate
from the strong national self-awareness and pride of Turks. As one
respondent puts it, ‘‘[in] every Turk, nationalism flows through the
veins.’’ Being Turkish is an identity you inherited from your parents and
a cultural one in which you should take pride. This explains the high
scores in all three countries on the questions to what extent they felt
Turkish and felt proud of being Turkish.
The identification with the settlement country was based on living
there, having grown-up there, and attending school there. Many respon-
dents had a better knowledge of the settlement country society and culture
than of Turkish society and culture.
I can express myself better in German and, I mean, I grew up here, learned everything
here. I know that on the 24th Christmas is being celebrated here and the other things, the
Day of German Unity, I know the German …, for example the German history better
than the Turkish history.
(Germany, in-between generation, female)
The identification with the settlement country had thus an experiential
basis. Yet, why was the settlement country identification then so low?
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People’s identifications will be influenced, we reasoned, by their everyday
experiences. Many live in segregated neighborhoods, and the majority of
the respondents has a predominantly Turkish social circle. This is, how-
ever, not (only) a consequence of residential segregation but also of
personal preference. Most respondents said that felt more at ease with
other people of Turkish descent. They felt that settlement country mem-
bers cannot understand certain issues and are insensitive to certain cultural
and religious practices. Being Turkish also has behavioral consequences,
such as respect for the elderly and no premarital sex. Because these are
seen as important values that are not shared by the settlement society, this
impedes friendships with settlement society ethnics and settlement society
identification. Hence, the low identification with settlement country iden-
tity is partly the result of self-chosen exclusion. But what role does forced
exclusion play?
Although several respondents reported many instances of discrimina-
tion, this was not the general experience. Their identification with the
settlement country is hampered by a more subtle lack of acceptance: lack
of recognition. This is in line with the results from the survey that also
show a larger effect of recognition than of discrimination. Asked about
identification with the settlement country, respondents in all three coun-
tries often reported that they do not feel accepted as settlement country
members.
I live here, I have my residence here, I should be French. I do not feel excluded, I do my
shopping, I go downtown, I do everything everybody does, but at those moments when
people say ‘look you’re this’ then you wonder whether you’re really French. I vote, I listen
to the news, I keep up to date on what happens in France, but unfortunately….
(France, second generation, female)
But the first impression of people, who don’t know me, they see the dark skin, and they
are always, no matter where I am, surprised. ‘You speak accent-free German! Where are
you from if I may ask?’ And then I amuse myself and say ‘I am from [name of German
city]’. ‘No, I mean originally. You are so dark-skinned.’ [laughs] [..] I am surprised every
time again, that people think that those who are dark-skinned cannot speak German. We
grew up here. We have been here for thirty years!
(Germany, in-between generation, female)
Their dark hair and uncommon names, and for some women their
headscarves, were generally taken as a sign of ‘‘foreignness’’ no matter
their passport, place of birth, or language proficiency. Zhou and Lee
(2007) refer to this as the ‘‘immigrant shadow’’; the idea that all people
Identification of Children of Turkish Immigrants 925
with a certain physical appearance – in their study Asians and Latinos –
are immigrants. They argue that questions on origin and compliments on
language proficiency, that both hint at being perceived as immigrants,
hinder the identification of these children of immigrants as ‘‘American.’’
The experiences of Turkish children of immigrants in Europe also reflect
this immigrant shadow. Exclusion based on physical appearance is more
often cited in the Netherlands and Germany than in France. This possibly
reflects a less ethnic or ‘‘thick’’ national identity, but the fact that the
French population is on average less light skinned and blond haired than
the Dutch and German population might also play a role. That exclusion
was also felt in the Netherlands and France, the two countries with the
higher degree of individual equality, can explain why the cross-national
differences we found in the survey were modest in size.
The experience of exclusion made some respondents idealize Turkey
and dream of one day ‘‘returning.’’ The majority, however, said they had
no intention to live in Turkey. Most felt as much foreigners (and were
treated as such) in Turkey as in the settlement country. The above might
suggest that we are dealing here with an alienated group of people. Yet,
this is not the case. Coming back from a holiday in Turkey to the settle-
ment country is perceived as coming home.
When I’m on holiday, I want to go back to Germany. Finally go home, to [place of resi-
dence]. I feel better there, I was born and raised there.
(Germany, second generation, female)
When I’m in Turkey I really feel like being on vacation, of not being at home. And when
I return to France I am home. It is true that you sometimes don’t completely feel at
home, because you are sometimes viewed negatively. Nevertheless I feel more at home in
France than in Turkey [..] In Turkey people have another way of dressing, talking. They
are not like us.
(France, in-between generation, female)
The connection with the settlement country is most felt at the local
level (cf. Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters, 2004; Ehrkamp, 2005). This
sense of home is not only present among respondents that live in large
cosmopolitan cities but also among those who live in smaller towns and
villages. The majority of respondents have lived in the same town since
they arrived in the settlement country, or, for the second generation, since
their birth. This has created a strong sense of attachment to the settlement
country at the town or even the neighborhood level.
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So you feel more at home in the Netherlands?
Yes. More at home. More at home. Yes, because your neighbourhood, when I go to the
other side of town…When I see the skyline of my neighbourhood I already feel at home
(Netherlands, in-between generation, female)
So despite feelings of exclusion and strong attachments to Turkish
identity, the majority of the respondents felt an affective connection to
the settlement country. How can we account for this apparent contradic-
tion? The German language knows several words for ‘‘home’’ that have
different connotations. Heimat evokes the idea of roots, of having been
there forever (Ra¨thzel, 1994:89). It is an idealized place. Haus or Zuhause
more refers to the physical home but also to a place where one feels
secure. It seems then that our respondents in Germany, but also in France
and the Netherlands, feel at home in the settlement country, yet could
not and were not allowed to call it their Heimat.17 As one respondent
from Germany expressed it:
I say my Heimat is Kurdistan, my Zuhause is Germany. That is my opinion.
(Germany, in-between generation, male)
Therefore, the respondents found the question ‘‘Do you feel more a
member of the settlement country or more Turkish’’ difficult to answer.
And thus one French respondent answered:
It is a mixture of both, if you’d like. We live as Turkish families in France.
(France, in-between generation, female)
The problem seems to be that there is no appropriate concep-
tualization for children of immigrants’ feelings of connectedness with the
settlement country. This explains the peculiar asymmetry in the connect-
edness-item that we found in the survey and also the much lower scores
on the feel and pride items for settlement country identity than for ethnic
identity. They feel connected to the place they grew up in but are not
recognized by the settlement country as fellow citizens. Therefore, they
find it harder to identify as settlement country members and take pride in
that identity. Yet, this is also because of how they experience their
17Only one German respondent referred to Germany as her ‘‘Heimat.’’
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Turkish identity. They feel Turkish, because their parents are Turkish,
which makes not feeling Turkish and being proud of it a denial of their
parentage.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Previous studies have uncovered a broad range of factors that influence
immigrants’ identification patterns. However, they have paid relatively
little attention to the possible effects of national integration policies. This
stands in contrast with the steady stream of integration policy compari-
sons. Some of these studies try to develop a list of best practices in
response to the call in many countries for better policies to promote
immigrant integration. It is therefore important to explore what the
effects of national integration policies are. In this article, we asked to what
extent national integration policies affect the settlement country and eth-
nic identification of the children of immigrants. We developed five
hypotheses about possible relations between policies and identification.
We tested these on a sample of the children of Turkish immigrants in
three countries with different integration policies: Germany, France, and
the Netherlands. The sample was collected in a way that maximizes
cross-national comparability. Our study included both quantitative and
qualitative data.
Analysis of the data from a telephone survey showed no significant
cross-national differences in the degree of ethnic identification. Identifica-
tion with Turks was high in all three countries. This refuted the hypothe-
sis from the material cost-and-benefit perspective (H3) that predicted
higher ethnic identification in countries with more accommodation of
diversity (in our case, the Netherlands), and the reactive ethnicity hypoth-
esis (H5) that predicted higher ethnic identification in countries with less
inclusive policies (in our case Germany). In fact, the lack of cross-national
variance suggests that policies have little to no impact on the degree of
ethnic identification.
For identification with the settlement country, we did find cross-
national differences. While overall settlement country identification is
(much) lower than identification with Turks, the survey data showed
that settlement country identification in Germany is significantly lower
than that in France and the Netherlands. This fits with the hypothesis
(H4) based on Social Identity Theory that individual equality has a posi-
tive effect on settlement country identification because it increases the
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perceived permeability of the settlement group identity. However, the
analysis showed no significant difference between the Netherlands and
France. We thus found no support for the hypothesis (H2) that the
accommodation of diversity has an adversarial effect on settlement coun-
try identification, nor did we find support for the hypothesis (H1) about
a positive effect.18 The lack of difference between France and the Neth-
erlands is striking in light of Alba’s (2005) argument on the ‘‘bright’’
boundary formed by religion in Europe. He argued that the way religion
is institutionalized determines the brightness of the boundary between
the settlement society and Muslim immigrants (2005:31–32), and there
with the potential for settlement country identification. In Germany, the
preferential treatment of Christianity and Judaism over Islam is overtly
institutionalized (the former two are officially recognized religions, the
latter is not). In France, Alba contended – in line with Zolberg and
Long (1999) – the institutionalization is more subtle in nature. In the
Netherlands, Islam has been granted the highest degree of parity with
Christianity (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2010); nevertheless,
this does not seem to have led to a higher degree of identification, nor a
higher degree of feeling accepted by settlement country ethnics. An alter-
native explanation of this finding could be that the positive effect of
accommodative policies in the Netherlands has been canceled out by the
negative discourse on immigrants, and on Muslim immigrants in particu-
lar, since the Fortuyn revolt in 2002. A survey among Turkish and
Moroccan origin youngsters in the Dutch city of Rotterdam that was
held in 1999 and repeated in 2006, however, shows little change in set-
tlement country identification (Entzinger and Dourleijn, 2008). This
makes a rise of the far-right in the Netherlands an unlikely explanation
of our findings.
We investigated to what extent the cross-national differences in
settlement country identification can be explained by the degree of accep-
tance by settlement country members and experienced discrimination,
because this mechanism is implicitly part of the hypotheses based on
Social Identity Theory. We assumed that an inclusive policy would trans-
late itself into less discrimination and more recognition as fellow citizen.
Although we found no significant cross-national differences in discrimina-
18Although the accommodation of diversity does not impede identification with the settle-
ment country, in another study we did find that it might have a negative effect on other
aspects of socio-cultural integration (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011).
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tion, German Turks did feel significantly less recognized as settlement
country members than Turks in France and the Netherlands. Adding
these two variables to the regression analysis lowered cross-national differ-
ences. This provides further support for the thesis that the lower settle-
ment country identification of Turks in Germany is an effect of its more
exclusionary integration policy. This conclusion should be treated with
care, however, because the cross-national differences we found are rather
small, suggesting that the influence of policies on settlement country
identification is limited. The small size of the cross-national differences in
our study can, however, also be a consequence of our choice of countries.
There are a number of systematic differences between the policies in
Germany, France, and the Netherlands, but they are all European liberal
democracies. Therefore, their policies on the one hand differ from tradi-
tional immigration countries like Australia and on the other, from coun-
tries that are not liberal democracies. Of the three countries in our study,
even the country that offers the lowest degree of individual equality
(Germany) still offers immigrants many more rights than countries such
as Dubai or Libya.
Previous studies have shown the impact of socio-economic marginal-
ization on identification. We also found that education has a positive
effect on settlement country identification and labor market participation
a negative effect on ethnic identification. However, because we controlled
for these factors in the multivariate regressions, they cannot explain the
cross-national differences (or in case of ethnic identification, the absence
of cross-national differences) that we found.
What to make of the high level of ethnic identification compared
with settlement country identification and the small size of the country
differences? To answer this, we first had a closer look at our survey data.
Identification with the settlement country and with the Turks was
measured in the survey through three questions; to what extent do you
feel, feel connected to and take pride in Turkish and settlement country
identity. The level of connectedness to the settlement country was not
much lower than that of the connectedness to Turkey. Differences were
much more pronounced for the degree to which respondents felt, and felt
proud of being Turkish or a settlement country member. The data from
in-depth interviews allowed further exploration of this pattern. Identifica-
tion with Turks is strong in the sense that it is what they are and what
they take pride in but to a lesser extent feel connected with. Turkey is
not the world the respondents intimately know by experience. They often
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feel at least as much alien there as in their country of settlement. Settle-
ment country identification is weak in terms of what they feel they are
and take pride in, yet is stronger in terms of actual connectedness with
everyday world. They feel connected to the settlement country as the
place where they grew up and spent their lives. In that sense, the settle-
ment country is their home. It is an identification, however, that is
primarily with a local, not a national identity.
Our respondents feel that because they are born out of Turkish
parents, they are Turkish. Turkish identity is experienced as a matter of
phenotype, ancestry, and culture, hence as an ethno-cultural identity. But
so is the settlement country identity experienced by the settlement country
majority population. At least, this is how we interpret the Turkish respon-
dents’ experience of not being recognized as fellow settlement country
citizens. This was most felt in Germany, the country with the least open
citizenship regime. However, it was also frequently felt in the Netherlands
and France, countries that have a more civic citizenship regime. Although
a civic conception of citizenship is reflected in policies, everyday reality
reflects a ‘‘thicker’’ notion of citizenship, which does not include people
of a different ethnic origin, especially if they have a different skin color or
religion. This makes it hard for the children of Turkish immigrants to say
they are French, German, or Dutch. For the United States, Zhou and Lee
(2007) have also found that the hesitation of second-generation Asians
and Latinos to identify ‘‘simply as American’’ (2007:201) is often caused
by a lack of acceptance on the part of the settlement society. We found
our respondents’ weak identification with the settlement country to be a
result of exclusion – at the policy and the settlement society level – but
also of self-exclusion. To more accurately establish the effect of settlement
country characteristics (symbolic and material exclusion) on settlement
country identification, future research should include other immigrant
groups to test whether our findings also hold true for groups that have a
less strong ethnic identity and nationalism than Turks. To shed more
light on the role of religious boundaries, it would be interesting to look
at groups that are not Muslim such as certain sub-Saharan African and
Southeast Asian groups. Furthermore, it would be valuable to repeat the
study in more countries to see whether the same effects of the two policy
dimensions will be found.
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Germany France Netherlands
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variables
Turkish identification 4.33 0.79 4.43 0.68 4.46 0.69
Settlement country identification 2.37 0.89 2.83 1.11 2.77 0.94
Independent variables
East-Central Anatolia 0.55 0.50 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45
Alevi 0.15 0.36 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22
Second generation 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48
Female 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.50
No or only primary education 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Secondary education 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.45 0.67 0.47
Post-secondary education 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.40
Working 0.59 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.50
Phone sample 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.49
Holiday sample 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.23 0.20 0.40
Snowball sample 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.22 0.41
Share of Turkish immigrants 2.92 1.45 1.34 1.20 2.65 1.26
Seen as host country member 2.04 1.12 2.72 1.31 2.41 1.23
Freq. of experienced discrimination 2.38 1.21 2.39 1.21 2.28 1.18
APPENDIX B. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SAMPLE
CHARACTERISTICS
Germany France Netherlands
Mean SD SB Mean SD Mean SD SB
Dependent variables
Turkish identification 3.78 0.95 4.24 0.71 4.45 0.69
Settlement country identification 2.77 0.81 3.18 1.16 3.03 0.78
Independent variables
East-Central Anatolia 0.76 0.44 0.65 0.24 0.44 0.32 0.48 0.35
Alevi 0.28 0.46 0.30 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.23 0.05
Second generation 0.39 0.50 0.30 0.59 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.40
Female 0.67 0.49 0.65 0.65 0.49 0.58 0.51 0.63
No ⁄ primary education 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.05
Secondary education 0.83 0.38 0.85 0.76 0.44 0.58 0.51 0.60
Post-secondary education 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.24 0.44 0.37 0.50 0.35
Working 0.56 0.51 0.65 0.47 0.51 0.68 0.48 0.70
Relative size of Turkish immigrant population 3.07 1.51 1.96 1.15 2.96 1.34
Seen as host country member 2.33 1.08 2.88 1.22 2.33 1.28
Freq. of experienced discrimination 2.72 1.18 2.35 1.46 2.63 1.01
N 18 20 17 19 20
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